Home Office

Asylum policy

Tom Pursglove: Following the October 2018 publication of the Lift the Ban coalition’s report into asylum seeker right to work policy, which concluded that amending the policy could generate £42m per year for the Government, the former Home Secretary – Sajid Javid – committed to a review. Today I would like to announce the findings of that review. For clarity, current asylum seeker right to work policy allows asylum seekers to apply for permission to work if a decision on their asylum claim has been outstanding for 12 months or more, where the delay is no fault of their own. If granted permission to work, asylum seekers may then apply for jobs on the Shortage Occupation List. Lift the Ban’s report recommended relaxing policy to allow asylum seekers to work after six months, with no restrictions on access to the labour market such as limiting eligible jobs to the Shortage Occupation List. In July 2020, a follow-up to their 2018 report was published with the same policy recommendation but with updated estimated benefits to the Government of £98m per year. A further update in summer 2021 revised this further upwards to £180.8m per year. The Home Office has carried out a comprehensive review of the Lift the Ban report; however, our evidence indicates the assumptions underpinning the recommendations are highly optimistic. Having considered a wide range of available evidence the Home Office believes that a more realistic set of assumptions would present a more nuanced picture. In particular, the Home Office believes that a more realistic set of assumptions would consider the following: demographic characteristics (such as family groupings and likelihood of care responsibilities impacting access to the labour market)how employment rates for migrant groups tend to increase gradually over timethe propensity for part time employmentthe likelihood that any employment is more likely to be close to the minimum or living wage rather than the UK median wage. In addition, a significant proportion of the fiscal benefits calculated by Lift the Ban are predicated on an assumption that once asylum seekers are granted access to the workforce they will no longer require financial support. The Home Office believes that given the likelihood for part time and insecure employment this benefit is unlikely to fully materialise. This is because it expects that the administrative cost associated with moving asylum seekers on and off support as they cycle through periods of employment and support will be substantial. The Home Office has therefore concluded that the fiscal benefits arising from a relaxation of the right to work policy are likely to be significantly lower than the figures claimed by Lift the Ban. In light of wider priorities to fix the broken asylum system, reduce pull factors to the UK, and ensure our policies do not encourage people to undercut the resident labour force, we are retaining our asylum seeker right to work policy with no further changes. It is key this policy continues to protect our immigration system from those lodging unfounded asylum claims in an attempt to avoid work visa rules, particularly at a time when dangerous journeys made by small boat are increasing. Ultimately we must ensure asylum claims are considered without unnecessary delay. Our resources are therefore better deployed to pursuing an ongoing programme of transformation and system improvement initiatives that will speed up decision making, reducing the time individuals spend in the system awaiting an interview or decision. We recognise there are extraordinary circumstances affecting certain parts of the labour market at present. In response to these, we are offering time-limited visas to 4,700 HGV drivers in the food supply chain, 5,500 poultry workers, and 800 butchers to ease supply chain pressures this year. We will look at how the sectors concerned make use of these routes which were created in response to their requests. The Government continues to support industries in solving such issues in the long term through making roles more attractive to UK workers, with better pay and working conditions.

Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport

Telecoms Diversification: Update Against Taskforce Recommendations

Julia Lopez: I would like to update the House on a package of measures and policy interventions we are announcing today to progress the Government’s 5G Diversification Strategy and the recommendations of the Telecoms Supply Chain Diversification Taskforce.Following a 5G Diversification Taskforce recommendation, the Government has worked closely with industry to confirm a date by which 2G and 3G networks will be switched off. The Government can now confirm that the mobile network operators do not intend to offer 2G and 3G mobile networks past 2033 at the latest. The Government welcomes that some individual operators will switch off their networks, particularly their 3G networks, earlier than this date, and will announce their own plans about when and how they intend to do this. The Government welcomes the responsible switching off of these networks, and will continue to work with network operators to ensure a smooth transition that meets the needs of business users and consumers, including vulnerable groups.The Government is also announcing, together with UK mobile network operators, a joint ambition for 35% of the UK's mobile network traffic to be carried over open and interoperable Radio Access Network (RAN) architectures by 2030. The RAN is the part of the network that communicates directly with our devices, typically visible in the radio masts we see across the UK. Most networks today are characterised by closed ‘black boxes’ in which all of the components are highly integrated and provided by a single, highly-scaled vendor. ‘Opening’ the RAN seeks to disaggregate these components and functions, lowering barriers to entry and promoting innovation. The Government welcomes the steps taken by operators and suppliers to position the UK as a leader in the development of open and interoperable RAN technology and is pleased to commit £250 million of investment to support and accelerate this programme of work.As part of this work to promote interoperable RAN, the Government will be providing just over £36 million of investment to fund projects that span key technology challenges to Open RAN adoption as part of the Future RAN Competition (FRANC). This investment will also support industry, academia and local authorities across the UK to realise the benefits of high speed networks and create new commercial opportunities. Finally, the Government is investing a further £15 million in the SmartRAN Open Networks Interoperability Centre (SONIC Labs) to expand it into a fully-fledged interoperability testing facility that will break down barriers and support industry in developing interoperable solutions. This investment will enable the Lab to expand its programme of interoperability testing and international engagement. These projects will be subject to final grant funding agreement.The interventions demonstrate the Government's commitment to delivering its Diversification Strategy and building lasting and sustainable supply for the infrastructure that underpins our entire digital economy. The Government will continue to update the House as this work progresses. Full details of the announcement will be published on gov.uk today.

Department for International Trade

UKEF Update

Anne-Marie Trevelyan: The UK enjoys a strong relationship with Ukraine and is committed to supporting its security and economic prosperity. UK Export Finance (UKEF) has recently committed most of its market risk appetite for Ukraine to support a programme led by UK suppliers to upgrade the country’s naval capability. To ensure that UKEF can continue to support UK exporters assist Ukraine with improvements to its national infrastructure, and in-line with wider HMG objectives, the Government has concluded that it is in the national interest to increase UKEF’s market risk appetite for Ukraine to £3.5 billion and has instructed UKEF to make appropriate arrangements. This will leave around £1.2bn available for UKEF to support further priority projects, supporting skilled UK jobs and enabling additional UK exports to Ukraine.

Trade Policy Update

Anne-Marie Trevelyan: HM Government is committed to a robust and transparent export control regime for military, dual-use and other sensitive goods and technologies. The purpose of these controls is to promote global security and facilitate responsible exports. They help ensure that goods exported from the United Kingdom do not contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or a destabilising accumulation of conventional weapons. They protect the United Kingdom’s security and our expertise by restricting who has access to sensitive technologies and capabilities. Export controls also help ensure that controlled items are not used for internal repression or in the commission of serious violations of international humanitarian law. They are one of the means by which we implement a range of international legal commitments including the Arms Trade Treaty. The controls also support the UK’s defence and security industry. The legitimate international trade in military equipment and technology, as well as in dual-use items, enables governments to protect ordinary citizens, to preserve law and order against terrorists and criminals, and to defend against external threats. The Government therefore remains committed to supporting the UK’s defence and security industry and to promoting the legitimate trade in items controlled for strategic reasons. We keep our controls under regular review to ensure that they continue to properly address the threats we face, keep pace with new technologies, and adapt to changing circumstances such as our exit from the EU, while providing an efficient service which does not impose an unworkable administrative burden on the defence and security industry. That is why today I am announcing a package of measures to update the export control regime. First, I am laying before Parliament a revised version of the licensing criteria for strategic export controls, to be known as the Strategic Export Licensing Criteria, as set out at the end of this statement. These Criteria will be applied with immediate effect to all licence decisions (including decisions on appeals) for export, transfer, trade (brokering) and transit/transhipment of goods, software and technology subject to control for strategic reasons (referred to collectively as “items”); and to the extent that the following activities are subject to control, the provision of technical assistance or other services related to those items. Certain of the Criteria may also be applied to MOD Form 680 applications alongside other considerations and assessment of proposals to gift controlled equipment to other nations’ governments. As before, they will not be applied mechanistically but on a case-by-case basis taking into account all relevant information available at the time the licence application is assessed. While the Government recognises that there are situations where transfers must not take place, as set out in the following Criteria, we will not refuse a licence on the grounds of a purely theoretical risk of a breach of one or more of those Criteria. In making licensing decisions I will continue to take into account advice received from FCDO, MOD, and other government departments and agencies as appropriate. The application of these Criteria will be without prejudice to the application to specific cases of specific measures as may be announced to Parliament from time to time. This statement does not impact upon existing specific measures which remain extant until revoked. Second, the Government will be taking steps to enhance the Military End-Use Control. Currently, the control can only be applied to the export of otherwise non-controlled items which are intended for use as components in, or production equipment for, military equipment in an embargoed destination. This does not allow us to fully address threats to national security, international peace and security, and human rights arising from the use of non-listed items by the military, police or security forces, or entities acting on their behalf, in an embargoed destination. We will therefore be amending the definition of “military end-use” to remove this limitation. The control would only be applied where the Government informs the exporter that the proposed export is or may be intended for a military end-use in an embargoed destination. To minimise the impact on legitimate trade, there will be exemptions for medical supplies and equipment, food, clothing and other consumer goods. The review also concluded that there were anomalies and inconsistencies within the UK's export control regime. As a result of this review, China will be added to the list of those destinations subject to military end-use controls. Taken together, these changes will also strengthen our ability to prevent exports that might be used directly or indirectly to facilitate human rights violations in all destinations subject to military end-use controls. It also completes the export control review announced to Parliament on 12 January 2021 by the then Foreign Secretary. Both of these changes concerning military end-use controls require amendments to the Export Control Order 2008. We intend to lay the secondary legislation to implement these changes in the Spring of 2022. The Strategic Export Licensing Criteria  This statement of the Criteria is guidance given under section 9 of the Export Control Act 2002. It replaces the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria announced to Parliament on 25 March 2014. CRITERION ONE Respect for the UK’s international obligations and relevant commitments, in particular sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council, agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other international obligations. The Government will not grant a licence if to do so would be inconsistent with, inter alia: a) the UK’s obligations and its commitments to enforce United Nations and Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) sanctions, as well as national sanctions observed by the UK and other relevant commitments regarding the application of strategic export controls; b) the UK’s obligations under the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty; c) the UK’s obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention; d) the UK’s obligations under the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the Convention on Cluster Munitions (the Oslo convention), the Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (the Ottawa convention) and the Land Mines Act 1998; e) the UK’s commitments in the framework of the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Wassenaar Arrangement; f) the OSCE principles governing conventional arms transfers. CRITERION TWO  Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country of final destination as well as respect by that country for international humanitarian law. Having assessed the recipient country's attitude towards relevant principles established by international human rights instruments, the Government will: a) Not grant a licence if it determines there is a clear risk that the items might be used to commit or facilitate internal repression; Internal repression includes, inter alia, torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment; summary or arbitrary executions; disappearances; arbitrary detentions; and other serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in relevant international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. For these purposes items which might be used for internal repression will include, inter alia, items where there is evidence of the use of these or similar items for internal repression by the proposed end-user, or where there is reason to believe that the items will be diverted from their stated end-use or end-user and used for internal repression. The nature of the items to be transferred will be considered carefully, particularly if they are intended for internal security purposes. b) Exercise special caution and vigilance in granting licences, on a case-by-case basis and taking account of the nature of the equipment, to countries where serious violations of human rights have been established by the competent bodies of the UN or the Council of Europe; Having assessed the recipient country's attitude towards relevant principles established by instruments of international humanitarian law, the Government will: c) Not grant a licence if it determines there is a clear risk that the items might be used to commit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian law. In considering the risk that items might be used to commit or facilitate internal repression, or to commit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian law, the Government will also take account of the risk that the items might be used to commit or facilitate gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women or children. CRITERION THREE  Preservation of internal peace and security The Government will not grant a licence if, having assessed the potential that the items would either contribute to or undermine internal peace and security, it determines there is a clear risk that the items would, overall, undermine internal peace and security. When assessing the potential that the items would contribute to or undermine internal peace and security, the Government will take into account, inter alia and where relevant: a) Whether the grant of the licence would provoke or prolong armed conflicts; b) Whether the items are likely to be used other than for the legitimate national security or defence of the recipient; c) Whether the items would be likely to cause, avert, increase or decrease conflict or instability in the country of final destination, taking into account (inter alia): (i) the balance of forces between states or actors concerned;(ii) the potential for the equipment to have a significant impact on the effectiveness of existing capabilities or force projection;(iii) humanitarian purposes or impacts;(iv) the nature of the conflict, including the conduct of all states or actors involved, and any involvement by the UK and allied states;(v) border stability and legitimate national security interests of the recipient.  d) Whether the items might be used to commit or facilitate gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women or children. CRITERION FOUR Preservation of peace and security The Government will not grant a licence if, having assessed the potential that the items would either contribute to or undermine peace and security, it determines there is a clear risk that the items would, overall, undermine peace and security. When assessing the potential that the items would contribute to or undermine peace and security, the Government will take into account, inter alia and where relevant: a) The existence or likelihood of armed conflict in which the recipient would take part; b) Whether the recipient has in the past tried or threatened to pursue, by means of force, a claim against the territory of another country; c) The likelihood that the items would be used in the territory of another country other than for legitimate purposes including national or collective self defence; d) Whether the items would be likely to cause, avert, increase or decrease conflict or instability in the region, taking into account (inter alia):(i) the balance of forces between the states or actors in the region concerned;(ii) their approach to expenditure on defence;(iii) the potential for the equipment to have a significant impact on the effectiveness of existing capabilities or force projection;(iv) humanitarian purposes or impacts;(v) the nature of the conflict, including the conduct of all states or actors involved, and any involvement by the UK and allied states;(vi) border stability and legitimate national security interests of the recipient. e) Whether the items might be used to commit or facilitate gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women or children. CRITERION FIVE The national security of the UK and territories whose external relations are the UK’s responsibility, as well as that of friendly and allied countries. The Government will take into account: a) the risk of the items undermining or damaging the UK’s national security or those of other territories and countries as described above; b) the risk of the items being used against UK forces or against those of other territories and countries as described above; c) the need to protect classified information and capabilities. CRITERION SIX The behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards in particular its attitude to terrorism and transnational organised crime, the nature of its alliances and respect for international law. a) Having assessed the potential that the items could be used to commit or facilitate an act constituting an offence under international conventions or protocols to which the UK is a Party relating to terrorism or transnational organised crime, the Government will not grant a licence if it determines there is a clear risk that the items could be used to commit or facilitate such an act. In making this assessment, the Government will also take account of the risk that the items might be used to commit or facilitate gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women or children. b) The Government will also take into account, inter alia, the record of the buyer country with regard to: (i) its compliance with relevant international obligations, in particular on the non-use of force, including under international humanitarian law applicable to international and non-international conflicts; (ii) its commitment to non-proliferation and other areas of arms control and disarmament, in particular the signature, ratification and implementation of relevant arms control and disarmament instruments referred to in Criterion One. CRITERION SEVEN The existence of a risk that the items will be diverted to an undesirable end-user or for an undesirable end-use In assessing the risk that the items might be diverted to an undesirable end-user or for an undesirable end-use, the Government will take into account: a) the legitimate defence and domestic security interests of the recipient country, including any involvement in United Nations or other humanitarian or peace-keeping activity; b) the technical capability of the recipient country to use the items; c) the capability of the recipient country to exert effective export controls; d) the risk of re-export to undesirable destinations; e) the risk of diversion to terrorist organisations, individual terrorists or to transnational organised crime; f) the risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer; g) the risk of an undesirable end-use either by the stated end-user or another party. CRITERION EIGHT The compatibility of the transfer with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, taking into account the desirability that states should achieve their legitimate needs of security and defence with the least diversion for armaments of human and economic resources. The Government will take into account, in the light of information from relevant sources such as United Nations Development Programme, World Bank, IMF and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development reports, whether the proposed transfer would seriously undermine the economy or seriously hamper the sustainable development of the recipient country. The Government will consider in this context, amongst other factors, the recipient country’s relative levels of military and social expenditure, taking into account also any bilateral or multilateral aid, and its public finances, balance of payments, external debt, economic and social development and any IMF or World Bank-sponsored economic reform programme. OTHER FACTORS In exceptional circumstances the government may decide not to grant a licence for reasons other than those set out in Criteria 1 to 8 where the items may have a significant negative impact on the UK’s international relations.